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Portentous Sideshow: The Korean Occupation Decision
DONALD W. BOOSE, JR.

From Parameters, Winter 1995, pp. 112-129.
"The senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within . . . Korea north of
38 north latitude . . . shall surrender to the Commander in Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East . . . . [A]ll
ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in . . . Korea south of 38 north latitude . . . shall surrender to the
Commander in Chief, US Army Forces, Pacific."[1] -- General Order Number 1, Military and Naval
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers 2 September 1945
During the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II in the Pacific, attention has focused
largely on those events that were obvious historical turning points: the detonation of the atomic bombs and the
surrender ceremony that marked the end of the Japanese Empire. But even as General MacArthur was accepting the
Japanese surrender on board the USS Missouri, an American occupation force was preparing to sail for Korea. This
other operation, the result of a series of US wartime decisions, seemed very much a sideshow compared to the main
event taking place in Tokyo Bay. But it was a sideshow with serious consequences, for the movement on short notice
of an occupation force to Korea not only assured US access and influence and preserved half the peninsula from
communism, it also established the conditions that led to the Korean Conflict and thus played a role in shaping the
bipolar US-Soviet confrontation of the Cold War.[2]
Korea had always been a sideshow from the US perspective. Before World War II, Americans took little notice of
Korea, which had been a Japanese colony since 1910. Even after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Korea was
incidental to US operations in East Asia. In the Pacific, American efforts were directed at holding a line against the
Japanese assault and establishing a system of bases and lines of communications in preparation for a counteroffensive.
The strategic policy toward China was to keep that country fighting without a major investment of US forces.[3]
Korea, whether viewed in terms of the Pacific or of China, was far from American forces and as inaccessible as the
Japanese islands themselves.
Initially, American leaders tended to see Korea as largely a Chinese concern. But as the war continued, tensions with
the Soviet Union increasingly influenced American policy. The problem was that until near the end of the war, the
United States sought Soviet intervention in East Asia to place additional pressure on Japan and thereby reduce
American costs and casualties. At the same time, American officials also realized that postwar access and influence in
Northeast Asia was important to the United States and, if the USSR did intervene in the Pacific, it would very likely
end the war in occupation of Manchuria, Korea, and perhaps even part of Japan.[4]
Until his death in 1945, President Roosevelt was the ultimate arbiter of US policy. While his motivations remain
subject to debate, he clearly saw cooperation with the Soviet Union as essential to the prosecution of the war and to
establishing postwar peace and stability. He made great efforts to enhance that cooperation in the face of Stalin's
growing suspicions. Yet his actions reflected a pragmatic view, and he took a number of steps to limit Russia's postwar
influence in East Asia. At the same time, the President avoided making unequivocal statements or supporting actions
that would reinforce Russian suspicions or disrupt US public support for the war effort.[5]
US policy toward Korea was part of that pattern. Thus, Korean exiles seeking diplomatic recognition for a Korean
Provisional Government in China met with polite rebuff, at least in part to avoid stimulating Soviet reaction. There
were other reasons as well, including a desire not to "compromise the right of the Korean people to choose the
ultimate form and personnel of the government which they may wish to establish."[6] Roosevelt sought to sidestep this
government-in-exile issue and avoid a confrontation over Korea while still assuring postwar US influence by

proposing an international trusteeship in which the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union would
participate.[7]
When the Cairo Declaration was issued by Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Chinese
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on 1 December 1943, it read in part: "The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the
enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."[8]
While trusteeship was not specifically mentioned in the declaration, the concept was discussed by the Cairo
participants, as well as by Roosevelt and Stalin at the Teheran Conference, and the term "in due course" clearly
indicated that some temporary period of external supervision was to be imposed on Korea. Military planners assumed
that the trusteeship mechanism would come into effect at the end of the war, but while the Allies discussed the concept
from time to time, the Allied leaders never reached a formal agreement on the structure and operation of a
trusteeship.[9]
In late 1944, with invasion of the Japanese home islands under active consideration, the United States stepped up its
efforts to obtain Russian intervention.[10] Preliminary US-British-Soviet talks took place in the fall of 1944. At the
February 1945 Yalta Conference, Stalin agreed that Russia would enter the Pacific War two or three months after the
defeat of Germany. His conditions, accepted by Roosevelt and Churchill, included Soviet control of southern Sakhalin
and the Kurile Islands and (subject to agreement by Chiang Kai-shek) preservation of the status quo in Outer
Mongolia, Soviet access to the Manchurian port of Dairen (Lüda), control of the Port Arthur (Lüshun) naval base, and
Soviet railroad rights in Manchuria.[11]
As the war entered its final stages, Korean exile groups made new proposals to contribute to the war effort. Although
the United States continued its policy of nonrecognition of any exile group, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)
believed that individual Korean exiles might play some kind of role in psychological operations or in clandestine direct
action missions. To that end the OSS recruited agents and established training camps in China, but the war ended
before any missions were carried out.[12]
By the spring of 1945, the US Pacific commanders were formulating a plan for the successive invasion of the
southernmost Japanese home island of Kyushu (Operation Olympic) in November 1945 and of the main island of
Honshu (Operation Coronet) in June 1946.[13] US military planners briefly considered Korea as an alternative to
Kyushu for an advanced base from which to tighten the blockade and prepare for the final assault against Honshu. But
an assault on Korea, it was believed, would cost even more American lives than the Kyushu operation, and US forces
would still be far from their ultimate objective. Soviet intervention was no longer considered essential to the success of
the operation, although such intervention would, if properly timed, unquestionably shorten the war and reduce
casualties. Moreover, the JCS was reluctant to commit US forces on the Asian continent. In June 1945 they told
President Truman:
With reference to clean-up of the Asiatic mainland, our objective should be to get the Russians to deal
with the Japs in Manchuria (and Korea if necessary) and to vitalize the Chinese to a point where, with
assistance of American air power and some supplies, they can mop out their own country.[14]
Although the JCS still saw Soviet intervention as useful, if no longer critical, US-Soviet relations had deteriorated
markedly after the Yalta Conference. Among the factors contributing to this development were the death of President
Roosevelt, the influence on President Truman by advisors who favored a strong line toward Russia, US frustrations
over Soviet attitudes toward lend-lease and combined operations, and conflicting US and Soviet views on the postwar
treatment of Germany and Eastern Europe (particularly Poland).[15] Military planners were not insensitive to these
political considerations. Mid-1945 saw a marked reduction in American efforts to achieve Russian cooperation in
carrying out preparations for the forthcoming offensive. The JCS canceled plans to send US liaison teams into Russia
and to establish air bases in Siberia, and postponed discussions on a Pacific supply route to Russia.[16]
In May, Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew had sent memoranda to the Secretaries of War and Navy requesting
their views on the political effects of Soviet entry in the Pacific War. He suggested that prior to any implementation of
the Yalta Agreement, the United States should seek a firm commitment on the part of the USSR to the future freedom
and independence of Korea and an agreement that Korea be placed under a four-power trusteeship immediately upon

liberation. In reply, the two service Secretaries expressed a belief that the Soviets would enter the Pacific War at a time
of their choosing "with little regard to any political action taken by the United States." The United States had little
political leverage with regard to the Yalta Agreements, they pointed out, since those concessions were "within the
military power of Russia to obtain regardless of US military action short of war," and since Russia was "capable of
defeating the Japanese and occupying Karafuto [Sakhalin], Manchuria, Korea, and Northern China before it would be
possible for the US military forces to occupy these areas." In spite of these reservations about the effectiveness of such
a move, the Secretaries agreed that it would still be desirable to attempt to obtain the suggested commitments from the
Soviet government.[17]
In May 1945, US Special Representative Harry Hopkins traveled to Moscow as a preliminary to the upcoming
Potsdam summit. Although he was provided with extensive briefing papers and a detailed draft agreement on Korean
trusteeship for negotiation with Stalin, Hopkins' message to the President on the meeting stated only that "Stalin agreed
that there should be a trusteeship for Korea under China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States."[18]
This verbal agreement and a subsequent one made by Stalin to Chinese Foreign Minister T. V. Soong appear to be the
only accords on trusteeship in existence when the war ended.[19]
Nor did any substantive talks on the Korean trusteeship issue take place at the July 1945 Potsdam Conference. The
Combined Chiefs of Staff met with Soviet Chief of Staff, General Alexei E. Antonov, and his staff to discuss the
coordination and division of operations between US and Soviet forces when Russia entered the war, including the
coordination of air and naval boundaries near Korea. Nevertheless, except for a brief and inconsequential exchange on
22 July, the political leaders apparently did not discuss Korea.[20]
While nothing of substance regarding Korea took place in the tripartite forum, behind the scenes at Potsdam, in
Washington, and at the Pacific commanders' headquarters on Guam and in Manila, US leaders made decisions that
would have important consequences for Korea. These decisions appear to have been influenced by a number of factors:
concerns about Soviet actions and intentions, a new confidence that had emerged with the successful test of the atomic
bomb immediately before the summit, and consequent realization that Japan might surrender without an invasion,
allowing the United States to establish a presence in Korea without expending American lives in the process.
After he was informed that the atomic bomb test had been successful, President Truman asked Secretary of War Henry
L. Stimson to query General Marshall as to whether or not Soviet intervention in the Pacific was still desirable.
Stimson talked to Marshall on 23 July and interpreted the Chief of Staff's comments to indicate "that now with our
new weapon we would not need the assistance of the Russians to conquer Japan." But, Marshall cautioned, the Soviets,
with troops massed on the Manchuria border, were in a position to strike anyway, and thus get "virtually what they
wanted in the surrender terms."[21]
On the following day, General Antonov asked General Marshall if American forces could conduct operations "against
the shores of Korea" in coordination with the Soviet units that would conduct an offensive in the Korean Peninsula.
Marshall replied that no amphibious operations against Korea were planned, at least until after the Kyushu invasion,
because they would expose American shipping to Japanese suicide attacks in the Sea of Japan and would divert assault
ships from the landings on Kyushu. On 26 July, air and sea boundaries were established, but no provision was made
for ground boundaries. President Truman later recorded that "no lines were set up for land operations since it was not
anticipated by our military leaders that we would carry out operations to Korea."[22]
The President would have been more accurate had he said there were no intentions of carrying out combat operations.
In fact, the United States had begun planning for the noncombat occupation of Korea and stepped up the pace of those
preparations at the very time Marshall was coordinating with Antonov. In August 1944, the JCS had directed the Joint
War Planning Committee to "prepare plans for the occupation of Japanese-held strategic positions in the event of
withdrawal of Japanese forces, collapse of the Japanese Government, or surrender."[23] Little was done in this regard
until after the outline plans for the invasions of Kyushu and Honshu had been completed. It was May 1945 before the
Joint War Plans Committee turned its attention to the problem of contingency planning for Japan's surrender. The Joint
Planning Staff recognized that there were areas "other than Japan proper" which the United States might find it
necessary to seize. By June, the joint planners were including Korea (as well as places in Manchuria, Formosa
[Taiwan], Indochina, and the China Coast) as being among those areas.[24] On 14 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

ordered General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz to prepare plans "to take immediate advantage of favorable
circumstances, such as sudden collapse or surrender, to effect an entry into Japan proper for occupational
purposes."[25]
By 10 July, the Joint War Plans Committee had refined their outline plan. They anticipated that the United States
would be responsible for the occupation of Japan proper, Korea, the Shanghai-Nanking area of China, the enemy-held
Pacific islands, and Formosa, in that priority.[26] The JCS followed this up prior to the Potsdam talks by directing the
Pacific commanders to broaden their plans to include Korea. In response, MacArthur suggested that Tokyo and Seoul
should have first priority for occupation, with Pusan and Kunsan having second and third priority. Thus, as the
Potsdam Conference convened, the Joint War Plans Committee in Washington, General MacArthur's staff in Manila,
and Admiral Nimitz's staff on Guam had all made considerable progress on occupation plans.[27]
On 25 July, during the Potsdam conference, Marshall provided Truman a memorandum on the status of planning for a
sudden Japanese surrender, informing the President:
Instructions were issued in June to General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz to prepare plans for
occupation of Japan in event of a sudden collapse or surrender. Further instructions were issued to these
commanders last week to include Korea in their plans and both commanders were informed that collapse
or surrender might occur before Russia entered the war. General Wedemeyer [Commanding General, US
Forces, China Theater] was also informed.[28]
On the same day (the day after his initial talks with Antonov), Marshall directed Lieutenant General John E. Hull,
Chief of the War Department Operations Division (OPD), to be prepared to move some troops into Korea. Hull did
some preliminary planning with regard to possible ground boundaries between US and Soviet forces in the peninsula.
Since it was considered necessary that at least two major seaports be included in the American zone (presumably for
logistical support), a tentative line was drawn north of Seoul, "not on the 38th Parallel but near it and, generally, along
it."[29]
Marshall then wired MacArthur, advising him that "it appears likely that decisions may be reached in the near future
on the occupation, control and treatment of Japan after the Japanese capitulation," and requesting MacArthur's views
on the occupation of Japan and Korea. At the same time, Hull dispatched a message to OPD requesting them to
"forward immediately gist of available information on MacArthur's plans for occupation of Japan and Japanese held
areas in event of Japanese collapse or surrender in immediate future."[30]
Both Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur had prepared occupation plans in the event of a sudden Japanese
surrender in response to the JCS directive of 14 June. The Navy plan (Campus) called for the initial occupation of
Tokyo by naval forces followed by landing of Army units in principal areas throughout Japan. MacArthur's plan
(Blacklist) provided for the landing of strong forces from all three services in Tokyo, followed later by the occupation
of secondary areas. A JCS plan, a combination of Campus and Blacklist, was also developed. But this plan was still
under discussion when Japan surrendered, and in fact it was Blacklist ("with ad hoc modifications") which was
used.[31]
The Blacklist plan was still under development, however, when the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on 6
August 1945. Two days later, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov summoned Japanese Ambassador Sato and informed
him that a state of war would exist between the Soviet Union and the Japanese Empire as of 9 August. On 9 August
the US detonated the second atomic bomb, over Nagasaki, and Soviet troops crossed the Manchurian border in an
attack against the Japanese Kwantung Army.[32]
On 10 August, the Japanese government indicated its willingness to surrender and asked for an armistice. This initiated
days and nights of frantic and confused activity as American officials, planners, and action officers in Washington and
the Western Pacific redirected their efforts from combat operations to preparations for the occupation and
administration of Japan and its conquered territories. The State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) and
the Joint Staff Planners began a series of long conferences to develop the necessary instruments of surrender.[33]
A key document would be General Order 1, the first paragraph of which designated in detail the particular Allied

authority to whom the Japanese forces in each area of the Far East were to surrender. This explicit information was
intended to forestall jurisdictional quarrels between Allied commanders and to prevent attempts at opportunism on the
part of Japanese commanders who might otherwise use promises of surrender to cause dissension among the Allies.
Colonel C. H. Bonesteel III, Chief of the OPD Policy Section and member of the SWNCC Far Eastern Subcommittee,
was directed to write a draft of General Order 1 for the consideration of the Joint Staff Planners and the SWNCC.
Proposals for this document had been developed by the Joint Postwar Committee as early as December 1944, but the
early versions did not provide explicit instructions as to who would accept the Japanese surrender in which areas.[34]
Colonel Bonesteel and another member of his section, Colonel Dean Rusk, retired to an adjoining room to clarify these
points. With regard to Korea, the problem was to reconcile State Department guidance that the boundary should be as
far north as possible, with the inability of the United States to move troops to Korea quickly. Soviet troops were
known to be advancing rapidly toward Korea, while the US forces designated for the occupation of the peninsula (and
the forces closest to Korea) were on Okinawa with priority for troop movement going to those elements that would
occupy Japan. A major consideration was the desirability of including three specific areas in the American zone: Seoul
(the capital of Korea and the area designated for the initial Blacklist landings), Kaesong (an ancient capital city), and
prisoner of war camps near Seoul. The previous discussions at Potsdam by General Marshall and General Hull
concerning a US-Soviet boundary in Korea and the Blacklist Plan, although known to Colonel Bonesteel, influenced
his deliberations only insofar as they reflected the time and space factors involved in the transportation of US troops to
Korea.[35]
An important consideration, as Bonesteel later described it, was the nature of the boundary line to be selected:
A first matter for choice was whether the line should serve Korean provincial boundaries or be a more
non-political designator. The Allies, at the summit conferences, had agreed that Korea would be removed
from Japanese hegemony and in due course become again an independent nation. However there was
considerable vagueness in how this formula would be carried out and it was felt that every effort should be
made to avoid the implication that the line for surrender had any political connotation in regard to the
evolution of an independent Korea. Thus the choice of a parallel of latitude over the perhaps more
recognizable provincial boundaries.[36]
With these considerations in mind, Bonesteel and Rusk recommended the 38th Parallel as the boundary in Korea,
dividing the country roughly in half and placing Seoul, Kaesong, and the prisoner of war camps in the American zone.
The draft first paragraph of General Order 1 (which covered the surrender of Japanese forces throughout the Far East
as well as Korea) was put in the hands of Brigadier General George A. Lincoln, Chief of the OPD Strategy & Policy
Group, who, in the early hours of 11 August, presented it to the Joint Staff Planners.[37]
One of the Joint Planners suggested that the boundary should be moved up to the 39th Parallel, a line which, if
extended into the Liaotung Peninsula, would put the Manchurian ports of Dairen and Port Arthur in the American
zone. General Lincoln suggested that the Soviets would be unlikely to accept a boundary that excluded them from
Dairen and that it would be difficult to get American forces to the two seaports before the Russians arrived. A
telephone call was put through to Assistant Secretary of State James Dunn, who expressed a view that Korea was
considered politically more important to the United States than Dairen. Accordingly, the 38th Parallel recommendation
was retained when the Joint Planners passed the draft of General Order 1 along to the SWNCC.[38]
While these deliberations were taking place, there were ominous signs from Moscow that would directly affect the
Korean question. Edwin W. Pauley, the Presidential Representative on Reparations, reported that the Soviets were
becoming truculent in the reparations negotiations. Wiring from Moscow, Pauley urged the President to occupy as
much of the industrial area of Korea as possible until a satisfactory agreement on reparations was concluded.
Ambassador Harriman warned the President that Stalin was making increasing demands on the Chinese Foreign
Minister and recommended that the United States send troops to Korea and the Kwantung Peninsula.[39] At the same
time, Russian troops continued to advance in Manchuria and Korea. Colonel General Ivan Chistyakov's Twenty-fifth
Army crossed the Tumen River and attacked overland while Soviet naval task forces conducted amphibious operations
along the northeastern Korean coast.[40]

On 15 August, the SWNCC sent a clean draft of General Order 1 to the White House. President Truman approved the
order and sent copies to Moscow and London. General Lincoln recommended that if the Russians refused to accept the
proposed boundary in Korea and occupied Seoul ahead of MacArthur's troops, the American occupation forces should
be sent to Pusan. As it turned out, however, Stalin made no objection to the 38th Parallel proposal.[41]
On Okinawa and in the Philippines, the forces designated to occupy Korea began frantic preparations to move to
Seoul.[42] The Blacklist plan designated General Joseph W. Stilwell, former US commander in China, as the
commander of the Korean occupation. Stilwell spoke Chinese and had years of experience in East Asia, but he had
often clashed with Chiang Kai-shek and had left China in October 1944. Now he commanded the Tenth Army on
Okinawa and had been preparing to play a major role in the assault on Japan when the war ended. His occupation
force was to include Tenth Army Headquarters, two infantry divisions, plus combat and support elements from
Lieutenant General John R. Hodge's XXIV Corps. Hodge and his headquarters would remain behind to garrison
Okinawa.[43]
Major General Frank D. Merrill, Stilwell's Chief of Staff, announced on 11 August that Tenth Army would occupy
Korea 27 days after "B Day"--the day on which peace talks would begin and occupation operations would be initiated.
During the next two days the Tenth Army staff reviewed the Blacklist plan. Almost immediately, however, a
significant change in plans was announced. On 13 August, General Stilwell flew to Manila to confer with General
MacArthur and to undergo minor surgery. While he was there, Tenth Army Headquarters received a message advising
them that Blacklist was amended: XXIV Corps would assume responsibility for the Korean occupation, and the Tenth
Army Headquarters would remain on Okinawa. It would not be Stilwell, the old Asia hand, who would command the
Korean occupation, but Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, a solid combat commander, but a man with no particular
qualifications to administer a liberated Asian nation. The reasons for this change are not completely clear. MacArthur
shared with Stilwell the gist of an "eyes only" message from Washington. Apparently, Chiang Kai-shek had heard that
Stilwell would command US troops landed on the "China coast" and Truman had assured him that this was not true.
Since Korea might, in Washington, be considered a part of the "China coast," MacArthur decided to pull Stilwell from
the Korean occupation. "So, they cut my throat again," Stilwell mused in his diary. "Why did they let me come out
here if they were not going to back me up?"[44] This change in the occupation commander had serious consequences.
During the occupation Hodge proved to be insensitive to the complex and volatile Korean environment and made
decisions that aggravated an already difficult situation.[45]
On 15 August, President Truman announced that the Japanese government had accepted the terms of surrender.
General Merrill advised the XXIV Corps staff that 15 August was B Day; serious preparations for the move to Korea
now began. The Blacklist plan designated who would go where in the course of the occupation and gave a general idea
of what they would do when they got there. When the war ended, however, almost none of the preliminary actions
necessary to implement the plan had been carried out. Although the corps headquarters and the 7th Infantry Division
were on Okinawa, the other units assigned to the Korea occupation force were located on Iwo Jima, Angaur
(southernmost of the Palau Islands), and various islands throughout the Philippines. They would have to be embarked,
transported to Okinawa, and then moved to Korea. Shipping was at a premium at the time, and movement of the
massive occupation force to Japan had first priority. Responsibility for this difficult transportation task was assigned to
Vice Admiral Daniel E. Barbey's Seventh Amphibious Force. Admiral Barbey and his staff were at Manila and his
ships were scattered across the Western Pacific, some as far away as New Guinea.[46]
While Admiral Barbey marshaled his transports and warships, the XXIV Corps Army Support Command (24th
ASCOM) began developing loading plans and accumulating the supplies required to support the occupation troops. An
enormous quantity of supplies had been stockpiled on Okinawa in preparation for the invasion of Japan. The
reallocation of those supplies to the occupation force was a major task which had to be performed in a very short time.
Confusion was inevitable. General MacArthur's headquarters warned the occupation commanders that because supply
ships were being diverted from other duties to support the occupation force, supplies and materials arriving in occupied
areas would not be those that would ordinarily be shipped to meet requirements for support of troops.[47] XXIV Corps
was moving from a tropical area to one where a severe winter could be expected. All the corps troops were in summer
uniforms and had no winter equipment. Fortunately, a cargo ship full of woolen uniforms, stoves, and tents was
discovered en route to Alaska. The ship was diverted and arrived at Inchon shortly after the occupation force.[48]

While the 24th ASCOM labored to prepare men and supplies for loading on Admiral Barbey's ships when they arrived,
General Hodge worked to find out what was going on in Korea. His immediate problem was a lack of information
about what the Russians and Japanese were doing. By 22 August it was clear that the Russians had occupied
Manchuria, but the situation in Korea was obscure. General MacArthur, still under the impression that the occupation
was to be on a quadripartite basis, sent a message to the War Department requesting information on the agreements
reached with the allied nations (especially Russia) regarding Korea. The SWNCC sent a reply to General MacArthur
on 1 September, advising him:
In the absence of declared intentions by the United Kingdom, China, or other United Nation, initial
occupation of Korea will be by US and Soviet forces only. . . . The matter of international arrangement
with regard to Korea is under urgent consideration by the State Department.[49]
Before he received this message, MacArthur sent a letter to Hodge advising him that "Consideration must be given to
the possibility that the Russians may occupy the Keijo [Seoul] area prior to the landing of the XXIV Corps." General
MacArthur concluded that US forces were "clearly" authorized to enter Keijo to receive the surrender. Furthermore, he
desired that they do so even if Russian forces were already present. General Hodge was therefore ordered to proceed to
Inchon and, if Russians were there, to make prior contact with them. MacArthur should be notified and the landing
delayed, if "events indicate that international complications will result."[50]
On 29 August, General MacArthur radioed the Japanese government that the landing in Korea would take place on 7
September. He ordered them to direct the Japanese commander in South Korea to establish contact with General
Hodge by 31 August and gave instructions concerning the preparations to be made to receive the occupation force.
Radio contact was finally established with the Japanese military commander in Seoul on 1 September. Hodge now
knew for certain that Russian forces had not moved into South Korea.
An advance party from Hodge's headquarters flew to Korea on 4 September. Since the Russian consulate had
continued to operate in Seoul throughout the short Russo-Japanese War, the advanced party had no difficulty in
carrying out General MacArthur's order to make prior contact with the Russians.
Although the Japanese surrender occurred before the plan for the movement of occupation forces to Korea was
complete, the plan as it existed had provided enough guidance so that troops, transportation, and equipment could be
marshaled and the landings accomplished within the time schedule originally established. The occupation, in the
tactical sense, was carried out with as fair a degree of success as could be expected of any hasty military operation.
With regard to military government and civil affairs, however, the situation was far more serious.
To begin with, General Hodge's command suffered from a lack of trained civil affairs specialists. For reasons which
remain unclear (perhaps because of the relatively low priority with which planners had viewed Korea), the US military
did not begin serious efforts at Korea-oriented civil administration training until the end of the war.[51] Whatever the
reason, military government personnel had not been assigned to XXIV Corps, nor had any civil affairs units been
designated or trained for Korea.
In order to provide a nucleus of officers who could begin planning for the military government, the Tenth Army AntiAircraft Artillery Command was designated to act as the Military Government Headquarters. None of the officers of
this command was trained in civil affairs, but an additional 20 civil affairs officers (none with any knowledge of
Korea) were later transferred to Hodge's command from Tenth Army. A few additional civil affairs officers were
subsequently diverted from Japan to Korea, but none of them arrived until after the landing at Inchon. Korea-oriented
civil affairs training for units slated for Korea did not even begin until September 1945. As a result, in the crucial early
days of the occupation the military government of Korea was carried out not by trained civil affairs specialists, but by
combat troops.[52] Moreover, there were no Korean linguists. After the long Japanese occupation, most Koreans could
be expected to understand Japanese, but they would understandably prefer that the military government use their own
language. No Americans on Okinawa could speak Korean. A search of the island finally turned up "six paroled Korean
prisoners of war, who were accordingly attached to the XXIV Corps."[53]
An even more serious difficulty was the lack of policy guidance. General Hodge had not received any instructions on
such key questions as Korean independence, the severing of Korea from Japanese influence, and domestic Korean

politics. Nor was General MacArthur at Manila any better informed. His 22 August message to the JCS urgently
requested information for the guidance of the XXIV Corps. In the course of preparing a reply, the SWNCC advised the
JCS that "there is no agreed United States view as to the character of administration of civil affairs in Korea."[54] Four
days later the US Consul General at Manila advised the State Department that General MacArthur had not yet received
any directive regarding Korea. On 18 August General Hodge requested that the State Department send him a
representative to provide political guidance. In response, Mr. H. Merrell Benninghoff was dispatched to Okinawa,
arriving on 3 September just before the XXIV Corps embarked. His instructions had been scanty and he could add
little to Hodge's knowledge of American policy toward Korea. A week after the occupation began, Benninghoff sent a
letter to the State Department advising that one of the great difficulties facing the American headquarters was a total
absence of any policy guidance. In fact, the initial directive on civil affairs administration in Korea was not sent from
Washington until 17 October 1945, more than a month after the arrival of Hodge's advance party.[55]
Finally, there was the problem for the occupation force of finding any information about the country they were to
occupy. One of the few sources of intelligence was the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study of Korea (JANIS 75),
which had been published in April 1945. This document contained some useful data but was superficial. Korean
prisoners of war captured on Okinawa were interrogated and provided a small amount of additional information. Since
the situation in Korea was obscure and General MacArthur wanted to avoid any incidents prior to the occupation,
aerial reconnaissance of Korea was forbidden. However, some recent prints of aerial photographs were discovered, and
the XXIV Corps staff persuaded an Army Air Force reconnaissance squadron on Okinawa to fly a few photographic
sorties. The resulting photographs, although inadequate for combat operations, were useful for planning the
deployment of the occupation troops. Thus, in the absence of any more authoritative information, the former antiaircraft gunners of the newly formed Military Government Headquarters planned for the occupation of Korea using
War Department field manuals, some illicit aerial photographs, the Cairo Declaration, and JANIS-75.[56]
After Admiral Barbey marshaled his ships and set sail for Okinawa, his arrival was delayed by a series of typhoons,
one of which devastated Okinawa and caused a week-long delay in the loading of the XXIV Corps. But by 5
September the lead elements of XXIV Corps were en route to Korea, landing at Inchon on the afternoon of 8
September.[57]
The decisions having been made and the forces having been gathered and deployed across the vastness of the Western
Pacific, the American occupation of Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude now began. But within Korea lay
powerful, pent-up nationalist emotions and deep social and political schisms. While in American eyes Korea still lay
in the shadow of Japan and events in Europe, it was, in fact, at the sensitive nexus where American and Soviet
interests intersected. The Americans who occupied Korea entered an extraordinarily sensitive, complex, and strangely
unfamiliar environment. They did well on a day-to-day basis, but they made many mistakes--some from arrogance,
but most from ignorance, lack of forethought, and unpreparedness for their task. In succeeding years, Koreans and
Americans would pay a heavy price for the failure to pin down an international agreement on Korean trusteeship, the
lack of preparation for civil administration, and the hasty decision in selecting the American occupation commander.
September 1945 saw not only the beginning of the occupation of Korea, but also the beginning of the march toward the
Korean War.
We can never know how events might have unfolded had the United States not deployed occupation forces to Korea in
1945, but two consequences seem beyond dispute. Without the occupation, Korea would have become a communist
state and the Korean War as we know it would never have occurred. The Cold War would certainly have taken a
different course, in detail, if not in its fundamental outline. Americans can take pride in the proficiency and
professionalism with which a large occupation force was marshaled and lifted across the Western Pacific on short
notice. Many may argue that, for all the subsequent cost in blood and treasure, that deployment was a fortunate event.
But they may also ponder how much better the outcome might have been had the Americans been as proficient in the
politico-military aspects as they were in the operational aspects of the occupation.
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